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Conditional Access patterns that don't break for travelling execs

The Conditional Access policy set we actually deploy for Australian businesses. Block legacy auth, require MFA, require compliant device — without locking out execs in airport lounges.

Daniel Brown · 22 April 2026 · 8 min read

Conditional Access is the most powerful security control in Microsoft 365 and the most commonly misused. Deployed well, it's the biggest lever you can pull on account takeover risk. Deployed badly, it's the reason your CFO can't log in from Singapore at 9pm on a Sunday.

This is the policy set we deploy for Australian mid-market businesses. It's structured as an override stack — each policy does one thing, in priority order, and every policy has a break-glass account excluded.

Policy 1 — Block legacy authentication

Legacy auth (IMAP, POP, SMTP AUTH, older Exchange Web Services clients, MAPI over HTTP with basic auth) bypasses MFA entirely. Any Conditional Access program that doesn't start here is theatre.

Target: all users, all cloud apps, client apps = 'Exchange ActiveSync clients + Other clients'. Grant: block. Exclude a break-glass admin account. Run in report-only for 14 days first — you will find at least one integration you didn't know used basic auth.

Policy 2 — MFA for all users, all apps

Target: all users, all cloud apps. Grant: require MFA. Exclude break-glass, and — critically — exclude service principals / managed identities that shouldn't be doing user auth.

This is a blunt policy. Pair it with Policy 3 below so that 'MFA required' doesn't mean 'prompt every login' in practice.

Policy 3 — Sign-in frequency on managed devices vs unmanaged

On compliant, Intune-managed devices, sign-in frequency = rolling (token persists for the default 90 days). On unmanaged devices, sign-in frequency = 8 hours, and set 'persistent browser session' to 'never persistent'.

This is the policy that keeps executives happy. On their managed laptop, they sign in Monday and don't see an MFA prompt again all week. On a hotel business-centre PC, every session is time-boxed and non-persistent.

Policy 4 — Require compliant device for sensitive apps

Target: admin portals, SharePoint sites tagged as high-sensitivity, HR and finance apps. Grant: require device to be marked compliant OR require Hybrid Entra join.

This is the policy that stops the 'valid creds on a random iPad' attack. It's also the one that breaks BYOD the hardest — so scope it tightly to apps and sites that actually warrant it.

Policy 5 — Phishing-resistant MFA on admin roles

Target: users in admin directory roles (Global Admin, Privileged Role Admin, etc.). Grant: require Authentication Strength = Phishing-resistant MFA.

This forces Windows Hello for Business or FIDO2 keys for anyone in a privileged role — SMS and Authenticator push are no longer enough. Under ML2 of the Essential Eight, this is mandatory on privileged accounts.

Policy 6 — Risk-based policies via Entra ID Protection

Target: all users. Grant: on high sign-in risk, require MFA + password change. On high user risk, block or require password change.

Identity Protection is an E5 / P2 feature. For Business Premium tenants, the equivalent is the 'risky sign-ins' detections surfaced in Entra ID, acted on manually or through Defender for Identity. If you have P2, turn these policies on.

Try it

Check where CA fits in your Essential Eight posture

Run the Essential Eight tool — Conditional Access sits across MFA, restrict-admin and user application hardening strategies.

Score each of the 8 strategies

Where are you on the Essential Eight — honestly?

Eight strategies. Four levels each. Pick the statement closest to your reality today. We'll map it to the Microsoft 365 tooling that closes the gap.

What's your target Maturity Level?

Maturity Level 2 — most orgs' pragmatic target

  • 01

    Application control

    Only approved applications can execute on workstations and servers.

  • 02

    Patch applications

    Internet-facing apps, browsers, Office, PDF readers patched promptly.

  • 03

    Microsoft Office macros

    Macros disabled unless from trusted locations and signed by a trusted publisher.

  • 04

    User application hardening

    Web browsers and productivity apps hardened against the most common attacks.

  • 05

    Restrict administrative privileges

    Admin accounts limited, separated and reviewed — the crown jewels of the tenant.

  • 06

    Patch operating systems

    Operating system patches applied on a schedule that matches the risk.

  • 07

    Multi-factor authentication

    MFA everywhere that matters — privileged accounts, remote access, important data.

  • 08

    Regular backups

    Backups of important data, configuration and software — and restores you have actually tested.

The travel problem — and the fix

The classic Conditional Access failure is the 'block untrusted countries' policy that the security team applied tenant-wide. Three weeks later, the CEO is in Tokyo and can't access SharePoint.

The fix: don't block by country. Use country signals as part of risk scoring (Entra Identity Protection does this natively), and require additional assurance on anomalous sign-ins — not a hard block. The pattern 'MFA + compliant device' is stronger and more portable than 'block if not Australia'.

Break-glass hygiene

Every Conditional Access policy above excludes a break-glass account. That account has: a 32-character random password stored in two physical safes, no MFA (the account is the MFA fallback itself), no Conditional Access applied, a Global Administrator role, and an Entra alert that fires on any sign-in activity.

You will use the break-glass account once a decade, if ever. But the one time you need it — tenant-wide Conditional Access misconfiguration, MFA provider outage, compromised admin account — you really need it.

Report-only, always

Every new Conditional Access policy goes into 'Report-only' mode first for at least 14 days. The What-If tool in Entra ID lets you test specific user/app combinations, but nothing replaces 14 days of real telemetry. The report-only sign-in log will show you exactly who would have been blocked, and why.

Common questions

Frequently asked

What Conditional Access policies should be deployed first in Microsoft 365?
Frontrow deploys a six-policy stack in priority order: block legacy authentication, require MFA for all users on all apps, differentiated sign-in frequency for managed versus unmanaged devices, require a compliant device for sensitive apps, require phishing-resistant MFA on admin roles, and risk-based policies via Entra ID Protection where P2 licensing exists. Each policy does one thing, and every policy excludes a break-glass account.
Should Conditional Access block sign-ins from other countries?
No. The classic failure is the tenant-wide 'block untrusted countries' policy that leaves the CEO in Tokyo unable to reach SharePoint. The stronger, more portable pattern is 'MFA plus compliant device' — use country signals as part of risk scoring and require additional assurance on anomalous sign-ins rather than hard-blocking by geography.
Do admin accounts need phishing-resistant MFA?
Yes. The policy targets users in privileged directory roles and requires Authentication Strength set to phishing-resistant MFA, which forces Windows Hello for Business or FIDO2 keys — SMS and Authenticator push are no longer enough. Under Maturity Level 2 of the Essential Eight this is mandatory on privileged accounts.
What is a break-glass account and why does Conditional Access need one?
A break-glass account is excluded from every Conditional Access policy so that a tenant-wide misconfiguration, an MFA provider outage or a compromised admin account can't lock the organisation out entirely. It carries a 32-character random password stored in two physical safes, no MFA (it is the fallback itself), a Global Administrator role, and an Entra alert that fires on any sign-in activity.
How long should a Conditional Access policy run in report-only mode?
At least 14 days for every new policy. The What-If tool in Entra ID can test specific user and app combinations, but nothing replaces two weeks of real telemetry — the report-only sign-in log shows exactly who would have been blocked and why. For the legacy-auth block specifically, the report-only window almost always surfaces at least one integration still using basic authentication.

The matched next step

Find out where your own tenant would have failed

Most incidents start with a control Frontrow checks in week one: MFA coverage, legacy authentication, admin sprawl, unpatched servers. A security baseline review scores your Microsoft 365 tenant against the Essential Eight and hands you a prioritised fix list — whether or not Frontrow does the fixing.

Want Frontrow to run this with your team?

A 30-minute call with a senior consultant. No deck. Frontrow walks through your tenant, your priorities and the next sensible move.